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The Fiscal Implications of Inadequate Retirement Savings in Maine
Philip Trostel1
February 13, 2017

Introduction and Summary
This study estimates the future costs to taxpayers from new retirees in Maine and in the United
States as a whole (and there are unreported estimates for each of the other 49 states). As in
previous reports of this type,2 “new retirees” refers to people turning age 65 in coming years.
The projections are for the 15 years from 2018 through 2032.
Inadequate savings for retirement creates fiscal costs due to increased elderly reliance on
public assistance (mostly in Medicaid, Supplemental Security Income, Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program, and housing assistance). An aging workforce moving into retirement is
increasing public-assistance spending on the elderly. Moreover, savings for retirement has
been declining in recent years, which will further exacerbate the problem. But the fiscal burden
from the retirement-age population does not have to grow. Simulations show that increasing
retirement income through greater preretirement savings can substantially reduce the need for
taxpayer contributions for public assistance.
Total means-tested public-assistance spending on the age 65 to 79 population is estimated to
be $37 billion nationally in 2016 (this does not include Social Security). Most (76%) of this fiscal
cost is federally financed. In Maine, public-assistance spending on the retirement-age
population was $164 million, with about $28 million of the fiscal cost financed within the state.

1

I am very grateful to Catherine Reilly deLutio for providing excellent research assistance.
Jay Goodliffe, Erik Krisle, Sterling Peterson, and Sven Wilson (2015) “The Cost or Retiring Poor: Cost to Taxpayers
of Utahns Retiring Poor,” Notalys LLC.
Karen Zurlo, Serah Shin, and Hyungsoo Kim (2015). “Retiring Poor in New Jersey: The Projected Expenditures on
Government Programs for Older Adults,” AARP.
2

1

Continuing demographic change (i.e., baby boomers reaching retirement age) will cause these
costs to rise substantially. The U.S. retirement-age population is projected to be 39% greater in
2032 than in 2016. Maine’s retirement age population is projected to increase 30% between
2016 and 2032.
Compounding this, asset accumulation among the U.S. preretirement-age population has not
kept pace with economic growth. In fact, preretirement asset accumulation has more than just
stagnated in recent years; it declined between 2006 and 2014. Although the recession, bear
market, and slump in housing prices were contributing factors, they do not fully explain the
downward trend. Moreover, the downward trend in asset accumulation has been particularly
severe in the lower half of the wealth distribution; that is, low- and middle-income households
who would most benefit from better opportunities to save for retirement.
After accounting for these trends, the national cost of public assistance on the retirement-age
population is projected to be $86 billion in 2032 (i.e., 2.4 times higher than in 2016, even
without any inflation). Maine’s fiscal cost is projected to increase to $362 million in 2032, with
state’s share growing to $61 million (2.2 times greater than in 2016).
The fiscal cost from the retirement-age population does not have to grow to such a magnitude,
though. Increasing retirement income through greater preretirement savings can substantially
reduce taxpayer contributions for public assistance.
Fiscal Costs of Recent Retirees
The fiscal costs of recent retirees in each state can be estimated well using recent individuallevel data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Annual Social and Economic Supplement of the
Current Population Survey (CPS).3 These data are collected in March of the survey year, but the
dollar amounts are for the previous calendar year.
The CPS is a fairly large national sample, each year averaging about 18,000 observations of
individuals age 65 to 79. For state-level analyses, though, the CPS samples can be too small to
produce reliable estimates. A small state such as Maine averages fewer than 300 observations
in the 65-79 age group each year, and some states have even smaller subsamples. For this
reason, five years of data are pooled together to increase the sample size. All dollar values are
converted to 2016 dollars using the Consumer Price Index (CPI).
Until the 2015 survey (i.e., 2014 amounts) the CPS contained the estimated insurance value of
Medicaid to individuals. The Census Bureau has stopped reporting those estimates, though:
“Due to security concerns, the Center for Medicaid and Medicare Services has limited the
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availability of data used to update the market value of Medicaid.” Given the importance of
Medicaid in this project, data for years 2009-13 are used in the subsequent analysis.4
The first columns of Tables 1 and 2 report the average5 means-tested transfer payments (both
cash and the dollar value of in-kind benefits) received by retirement-age individuals in the
United States and in Maine. The subsequent columns show the average amounts across
categories of “retirement” income, which is not a well-defined term. In this report the measure
is income from Social Security, pensions, annuities, IRAs, survivor’s benefits, and the imputed
return on home equity. This somewhat broad measure of retirement income predicts levels of
means-tested transfer payments better than narrower measures. Social Security is nearly 48%
of the measure, on average. The imputed return to home equity is 25% of the retirement
income measure.6
Table 1
Estimated Annual Means-Tested Public Assistance per Elderly - United States
(Average for Ages 65-79 during 2009-13 in 2016 $)
mean
"Retirement" Income

$25,827

less
than
$5,000

$5,000
to
$9,999

$10,000
to
$14,999

$15,000
to
$19,999

$20,000
to
$24,999

more
than
$24,999

Total Public Assistance

$987

$3,697

$2,210

$1,491

$724

$430

$270

Medicaid
Supplemental Security Income
Food Stamps
Housing Subsidies
Other

$520
$181
$143
$103
$40

$1,498
$1,221
$431
$436
$111

$1,147
$342
$321
$333
$67

$832
$137
$249
$215
$59

$422
$98
$122
$43
$38

$276
$39
$78
$8
$30

$195
$20
$38
$1
$17

85,272

7,866

7,758

12,054

13,715

10,547

33,332

N

Average retirement income in Maine is slightly (3.4%) below the national average, but
retirement income in Maine is not distributed as widely as nationally. That is, despite the lower
average retirement income in Maine, there are relatively fewer instances of particularly low
retirement income in Maine. Nationally, 10% of the retirement-age population have retirement
incomes below $5,620 (despite “retirement income” being measured broadly by including the
imputed return on home equity). In Maine, the bottom decile of retirement incomes is below
$7,668. The bottom four decile cutoffs in Maine are above the national cutoffs, and the median
retirement income in Maine is only 0.8% below the U.S. median.
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Table 2
Estimated Annual Means-Tested Public Assistance per Elderly - Maine
(Average for Ages 65-79 during 2009-13 in 2016 $)
mean
"Retirement"
Income

$24,956

less
than
$5,000

$5,000
to
$9,999

$10,000
to
$14,999

$15,000
to
$19,999

$20,000
to
$24,999

more
than
$24,999

Total Public Assistance

$841

$2,811

$2,214

$1,282

$755

$700

$185

Medicaid
Supplemental Security Income
Food Stamps
Housing Subsidies
Other

$377
$134
$164
$95
$70

$486
$1,171
$365
$588
$201

$707
$602
$488
$360
$57

$604
$46
$332
$159
$141

$500
$0
$124
$38
$94

$428
$58
$145
$1
$68

$136
$0
$30
$0
$18

N

1,541

103

141

235

273

198

591

Medicaid is the largest public-assistance program that the elderly receive both nationally (53%
of the total) and in Maine (45%). The dollar value of Medicaid is measured as its “insurance
value,” that is, its actuarial value based on age (child, adult, or aged), state, and disability status.
It is not measured as its usage of public funds for Medicaid.
The other important forms of public assistance for the elderly are Supplemental Security
Income, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, also known as Food Stamps), and
the value of federal housing assistance. The small “other” category in Tables 1 and 2 consists of
dependents’ school lunch subsidies, energy assistance, Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC), Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), other cash public assistance, and
Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants and Children (WIC). The reason
Maine’s other category is larger than for the U.S. is its larger amount of energy assistance
(heating subsidies).7
Most public assistance is administered through states but financed by the federal government.
Supplemental Security Income, SNAP, AFDC, and TANF are federal programs. The CPS measure
of the housing subsidy is the federal program. Medicaid, school lunches, and energy assistance
are partly state financed. Data from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services indicates
that in 2012-13 (earlier years are atypical in that they contain substantial extra federal
contributions from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act), states contributed 42% of
total Medicaid financing; and in Maine, 36% of Medicaid was state funding.
Determining states’ shares of school-lunch and energy assistance has always been complicated
by different state and federal fiscal years and accounting practices, but it has become more
difficult in recent years because the Consolidated Federal Funds Report was discontinued in
2010. Based on the available historical data, it is assumed that all energy assistance is federally
7

The CPS also has a measure of “educational assistance” that includes government financial aid such as Pell
Grants, but it includes employer contributions for education and scholarships and grants from non-governmental
sources. The amount is quite small (less than 1% of total public assistance) among the retirement-age population.
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financed.8 If it is assumed that states only contribute their minimums mandated by federal law,
states finance 28% of school lunches nationally, and Maine contributes 27%. It is also assumed
that cash assistance from the category AFDC, TANF, and other is all federal, and cash assistance
in the very small remaining category is funded by state and local governments.
Given these assumptions, nationally $233 of the $987 (24%) in means-tested transfer payments
per retirement-age population is financed by states. In Maine, $143 of the $841 (17%) in public
assistance per elderly is not financed federally.
Interpolating Census Bureau population projections indicates that there were 37,214,000
Americans age 65 to 79 in 2016.9 Combining this with the estimates in Table 1 indicates that
their total public assistance cost taxpayers nearly $37 billion. The federal government
component was $28 billion. Interpolating the population projections from the Maine Office of
Policy and Management indicate that there were 195,343 Maine residents age 65 to 79 in
2016.10 The estimates in Table 2 suggest their total public assistance cost taxpayers more than
$164 million, with $28 million financed within the state.
As one would expect, those with the lowest retirement incomes generally receive the largest
means-tested transfer payments. The relationship between total public assistance received
and retirement income is nonlinear. Public assistance declines rapidly with income at the
bottom of retirement income distribution, but then declines increasingly gradually through the
middle of income distribution. This is shown in Table 3, which reports the average level of
means-tested transfer payment across U.S. retirement income deciles.
For the subsequent analysis it is necessary to quantify the relationship between transfer
payments and retirement income. Moreover, the relationship needs to be quantified linearly.
Using a nonlinear relationship would require knowing or at least approximating the entire
distribution of retirement incomes, because the effect on public assistance could differ at every
level of income. To keep the analysis manageable a linear relationship needs to be estimated,
but the actual relationship is decidedly nonlinear. After experimenting with various
possibilities, a linear spline is estimated over U.S. retirement-income quintiles. This procedure
estimates different linear relationships between five groups of retirement income.

8
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Table 3
Estimated Annual Means-Tested Public Assistance over U.S. Retirement Income Deciles
(Ages 65-79 during 2009-13 in 2016 $)
United States
Average
Public Assistance
N
1st Decile (less than $5,620)
2nd Decile ($5,620 - $10,609)
3rd Decile ($10,609 - $14,209)
4th Decile ($14,209 - $17,493)
5th & 6th Deciles ($17,493 - $24,598)
7th & 8th Deciles ($24,598 - $36,062)
9th & 10th Deciles ($36,062 and greater)

$3,600
$2,215
$1,508
$802
$531
$329
$216

8,522
8,532
8,534
8,521
17,054
17,055
17,054

Maine
Average
Public Assistance
$2,587
$2,342
$1,112
$945
$641
$293
$122

N
115
160
163
166
332
326
279

A linear spline regression estimated over smaller groups would more precisely estimate the
nonlinear relationship, but it would also increase the risk of “overfitting” the data. That is, the
sample size is not large enough to prevent outliers from creating implausible blips in the
estimated relationship between public assistance and retirement income. The problem is
particularly severe at the state level. Estimating a linear spline over five quintiles appears to be
the best compromise between estimating the nonlinearity precisely but without overfitting it
too much.
The estimated linear splines are illustrated in Figure 1. For the U.S., the estimated intercept
(i.e., the amount of public assistance for someone with no retirement income) is $4,047. Public
assistance is estimated to fall by: 22¢ per dollar of retirement income over the first quintile
(income up to $10,609), 16¢ per dollar over the second quintile ($17,493), 3¢ per dollar over
the middle quintile ($24,598), 1¢ per dollar over the fourth quintile, and zero over the top
quintile. The estimated intercept in Maine is $3,712. Public assistance in Maine is estimated to
fall by: 21¢ per dollar of retirement income in the bottom quintile, 11¢ per dollar in the second
quintile, 3¢ per dollar in the third quintile, 4¢ per dollar in the fourth quintile, 11 and zero in the
top quintile.
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Figure 1
Estimated Relationship between Public Assistance
and Retirement Income
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Projections of New Retirees
Until 2005, the U.S. Census Bureau created population projections for every state. Since then
each state is responsible for constructing its own projections. However, there is significant
inconsistency in the data across the states. Each state has its own policies and methods for
creating population projections. Thus, the estimates vary considerably by methodology, cohort
definitions, and date. For instance, Delaware released projections in 2016 for single-age
cohorts every year through 2050. In contrast, South Carolina's most recent publicly available
projections of population by age group were released in 2005 and are for cohorts spanning as
many as 20 years of age every ten years through 2030. States’ methodologies also vary,
especially in regard to projecting/forecasting migration. Delaware bases net migration on
forecasts of state job growth, Kansas holds net migration constant, and Mississippi gradually
tapers off net migration.
Considering these inconsistencies (as well as avoiding having to interpolate numbers at each
age from five-year age groupings), we generate projections for all fifty states with a consistent
methodology using data from the American Community Survey (ACS).12 Each observation in the
ACS carries a sampling weight, i.e., the number of people in the population that each person in
the sample represents. Thus, it is straightforward to estimate the number of people at each
age in the year of the survey. The most recent year of the ACS is 2015.
Although the ACS is a large sample, the age-state cells can be rather small. For example, in
recent years Maine has an average of 218 observations in the relevant cells. Thus, the
estimates of the population at each age are not precise for small states. To reduce this problem
the most recent five years of data (2011-15) are pooled.
12
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To project the numbers into the future, survival probabilities need to be applied to the
population estimates generated from the ACS data. For example, someone age 58 in the 2013
sample would turn age 65 in 2000. The probability of that occurring is the survival probability
of 58-year-old reaching age 59 times the probability of a 59-year-old reaching age 60 times…
the probability of a 64-year-old reaching 65. These survival probabilities can be constructed
from death probabilities in U.S. life tables. The latest life tables are from 2012.13 Thus, the
population projections are the sample-weighted observed numbers at each age times the
relevant multiplicative survival probability to each future year.
The implicit assumption underlying this relatively simple approach is that there is no net
migration in the relevant age cohorts (i.e., those approaching retirement age). Net migration
for older cohorts is relatively small.14 15 Moreover, projecting net migration decades into the
future is tenuous at best (extrapolating trends from a few years of data runs into the same
“overfitting” problem discussed earlier – a few outliers can create obviously distorted
projections).
Tables 4 shows the estimated number of residents turning age 65 in 2018 through 2032 in the
U.S. and Maine. The numbers appear to be fairly close to official estimates. Both the U.S.
Census Bureau national estimates and Office of Policy and Management Maine estimates are
reported in five-year age cohorts and in five-year intervals. Interpolating these estimates yields
the numbers shown in Figures 2 and 3 along with estimates constructed here. The average
difference between the estimates constructed for this report and the interpolated official
estimates is +0.9% nationally and +1.9% in Maine. The cumulative difference in 2032 is -5.2%
nationally (interpolated between their 2030 and 2035 totals) and -0.02% in Maine.
These demographic projection reported in Table 4 suggests that the U.S. retirement-age
population (i.e., age 65-79) will be 39% greater in 2032 than in 2016. The projection for Maine
is for a 30% increase in the retirement-age population from 2016 to 2032.
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Elizabeth Arias, Melonie Heron, and Jiaquan Xu. (2015). “United States Life Tables, 2012” National Vital Statistics
Reports, V65, N8.
14
The rate of annual immigration (from other states and abroad) in the ACS data for everyone age 21 and older
was 2.55%. But for those age 50-64 the immigration rate was 1.50%, and for those age 65-79 the rate was 1.28%.
15
Maine had small net in-migration in recent years [see, e.g., Governing Data (2016). “State Migration Rates, Net
Totals: 2011-2016.”]. Maine’s net rate of interstate migration (i.e., not including migration to or from abroad) in
the 2011-15 ACS data for the 50-79 age group was 0.17% (1.40% interstate in-migration minus 1.23% outmigration).
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Table 4
Estimated Population Turning Age 65
United States
Turning
65

Year
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
2030
2031
2032

3,702,491
3,769,182
3,856,342
3,926,966
4,010,179
4,024,954
4,006,686
4,035,448
4,099,266
4,053,137
4,057,408
4,032,577
3,906,197
3,705,093
3,599,459

Maine

Cumulative
3,702,491
7,425,281
11,184,913
14,960,320
18,759,476
22,508,880
26,170,573
29,786,427
33,385,529
36,851,458
40,229,359
43,483,948
46,507,142
49,218,591
51,709,043

Figure 2
Projected 65-Year-Olds
United States
4,500,000
4,000,000
3,500,000
3,000,000
2,500,000
2,000,000
1,500,000
1,000,000
500,000
0

Author's Estimates using ACS Data
Interpolated U.S. Census Bureau Estimates
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Turning
65
19,571
20,381
19,868
19,798
21,103
20,461
20,624
20,526
19,381
19,831
19,223
18,366
17,681
16,545
17,495

Cumulative
19,571
39,707
59,058
78,055
98,055
117,074
135,900
154,242
171,025
187,831
203,566
217,959
231,158
242,687
254,610

Figure 3
Projected 65-Year-Olds
Maine
25,000
20,000
15,000
10,000
5,000
0

Author's Estimates using ACS Data
Interpolated Maine Office of Policy and Management Estimates

Scenarios 1 and 2
If retirement preparation is the same for future and current cohorts, and if public assistance
remains constant in real terms, the resulting fiscal costs of new retirees are shown in Tables 5.
This is referred to as Scenario 1.
The national fiscal cost under Scenario 1 exceeds $51 billion in 2032. This is 0.77% of all
government spending in FY 2016 – just for public assistance to those ages 65 to 79. The states’
share of this cost is 0.43% of net state and local spending in FY 2016.
Table 5
Estimated Fiscal Costs from New Retirees (in 2016 $) - Scenario 1
United States
Total
Cost

Year
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
2030
2031
2032

$3,653,530,740
$7,327,092,054
$11,037,008,184
$14,762,490,712
$18,511,408,193
$22,211,231,574
$25,824,503,811
$29,392,543,204
$32,944,052,119
$36,364,149,060
$39,697,382,048
$42,908,933,665
$45,892,150,157
$48,567,744,040
$51,025,263,299

Maine
Cost to
States
$863,416,307
$1,731,566,315
$2,608,307,832
$3,488,728,060
$4,374,686,525
$5,249,042,885
$6,102,945,149
$6,946,157,815
$7,785,463,935
$8,593,714,277
$9,381,436,599
$10,140,402,715
$10,845,407,805
$11,477,714,347
$12,058,484,663
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Total
Cost
$16,458,172
$33,391,120
$49,663,723
$65,639,416
$82,457,963
$98,451,727
$114,283,032
$129,707,659
$143,821,434
$157,953,542
$171,186,268
$183,289,448
$194,389,307
$204,083,960
$214,110,615

Cost to
Maine Govt.
$2,789,741
$5,659,959
$8,418,244
$11,126,203
$13,977,029
$16,688,050
$19,371,534
$21,986,084
$24,378,438
$26,773,900
$29,016,912
$31,068,460
$32,949,940
$34,593,232
$36,292,799

It is probable that levels of public assistance, particularly Medicaid, will grow in real terms as
real per capita income grows. Thus, the estimates in Scenario 1 are unrealistically low. Tables 6
reports estimates of a second scenario that assumes that levels of public assistance increase
along with increases in the standard of living. To be specific, it assumes that real public
assistance increases by 1.524% annually, which was the annual rate of increase in U.S. real GDP
per capita from 1991 through 2016.
In the more realistic Scenario 2, the national cost of public assistance to the retirement-age
population is $65 billion by 2032 (77% more than in 2016). The fiscal cost in Maine is $273
million in 2032 (66% more than in 2016). Maine’s share of the fiscal cost in 2032 is projected to
be $46 million.
Table 6
Estimated Fiscal Costs from New Retirees (in 2016 $) - Scenario 2

Total
Cost

Year
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
2030
2031
2032

$3,765,746,336
$7,667,240,613
$11,725,407,837
$15,922,284,455
$20,270,027,913
$24,692,023,268
$29,146,416,822
$33,679,024,132
$38,323,794,119
$42,947,121,373
$47,598,322,306
$52,233,201,864
$56,716,115,831
$60,937,573,120
$64,996,747,658

United States
Cost to
States
$889,935,524
$1,811,951,519
$2,770,993,062
$3,762,814,937
$4,790,290,239
$5,835,313,032
$6,887,992,290
$7,959,155,322
$9,056,825,065
$10,149,427,380
$11,248,616,909
$12,343,949,308
$13,403,368,619
$14,400,999,492
$15,360,279,087

Maine
Total
Cost
$16,963,673
$34,941,250
$52,761,345
$70,796,281
$90,291,629
$109,447,886
$128,983,732
$148,623,661
$167,307,380
$186,547,743
$205,257,343
$223,118,915
$240,237,304
$256,062,568
$272,737,322

Cost to
Maine Govt.
$2,875,426
$5,922,713
$8,943,307
$12,000,317
$15,304,874
$18,551,953
$21,863,375
$25,192,439
$28,359,421
$31,620,757
$34,792,126
$37,819,750
$40,721,401
$43,403,860
$46,230,313

Trend in Retirement Assets
The trend in, and distribution of, asset accumulation is examined using data from the Health
and Retirement Study (HRS). To be more specific, the version complied by RAND is used.16
Estimates of pension wealth constructed by Gustman et al. (2014) are also used.17 The HRS
contains very detailed information on asset accumulation, particularly for middle-aged

16

RAND HRS Data, Version P. Produced by the RAND Center for the Study of Aging, with funding from the National
Institute on Aging and the Social Security Administration. Santa Monica, CA (August 2016).
17
Alan Gustman, Thomas Steinmeier, and Nahid Tabatabai (2014). Updated Pension Wealth Data Files in the HRS
Panel: 1992 to 2010.
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households approaching retirement age. Unfortunately, the dataset is not large enough to
conduct state-specific analyses. Thus, only national numbers are examined.
The HRS has been conducted in waves every two years from 1992 through 2014.18 The
estimates of pension wealth, however, are only for the waves through 2010. All values are
converted into 2016 dollars using the CPI.
Two measures of total net asset accumulation are examined below. One is the HRS measure of
“total wealth excluding secondary residence.” Their broadest measure of total net assets,
“total wealth including secondary residence” would be preferable, but it is not measured in the
1996 wave and 42% of the observations are missing in the 1994 wave.19 The two measures are
closely correlated (their correlation coefficient is 0.987), however, and minimal information is
lost using the slightly narrower measure that is collected consistently. The average net value of
their difference (i.e., the net value of secondary residence) is 4.9% of total wealth.
The second measure examined below is the sum of pension wealth estimated by Gustman et al.
(2014) and the HRS measure of total wealth excluding secondary residence. Unfortunately,
pension wealth is not available for 2012 and 2014. Moreover, there are fewer observations of
pension wealth (6,739 per year on average) than for other wealth (18,880 on average). But
changes in pension wealth appear to be too important to omit from the analysis.
The age group examined for asset accumulation is ages 47 through 61.20 This is the age range in
2014 of the group reaching age 65 in years 2018 through 2032. Most of the observations in the
65-79 cohort observed in the CPS data in 2011-2015 were in the 47-61 age range in the years
1983 through 2007.
Table 7 reports mean and median levels of assets for preretirement Americans since 1992.
Despite generally increasing per capita incomes (U.S. real GDP per capita was 39% higher in
2014 than in 1992), there has been alarmingly little increase in assets among this group.
Indeed, average net assets have been on a downward trend since 2006. The recession in 200709 and the bear market (after controlling for inflation, both GDP per capita and the Dow Jones
Industrial Average did not fully return to their 2006 levels until 2013) were clearly important
contributors to this downward trend, but they do not appear to be the whole story.21 The
downward trend persisted even after income and stock values rose.

18

Actually, only most of the observations were collected in these even years, but most of the waves took two,
sometimes three, years to complete.
19
It also would be preferable to include the HRS estimates of the implicit value of Social Security pensions, but this
is calculated in only three of the waves (1992, 1998, and 2004).
20
In the case of couples their ages are averaged. Average ages 46.5 and 61.5 are rounded upwards.
21
Average house prices also fell in 2008-12, but this does not appear to complete the story either.
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Table 7
Estimated Total Net Wealth for Americans Age 47 - 61 (in 2016 $)
Not Including
Pension Wealth
Mean
Median

Year
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
Average N

$387,077
$430,303
$442,634
$458,032
$525,506
$498,680
$523,220
$573,533
$512,666
$458,169
$450,790
$444,966

Including
Pension Wealth
Mean
Median

$150,539
$167,940
$165,793
$164,618
$178,402
$194,781
$182,959
$203,577
$170,555
$73,965
$65,857
$70,562

$575,443
$608,436
$667,758
$745,728
$787,114
$766,361
$766,598
$851,981
$794,303
$716,003

7,119

$341,710
$360,760
$373,338
$410,936
$447,680
$465,538
$457,429
$486,594
$438,810
$318,435

3,760

The median levels reported in Table 7 reveal an even bleaker picture of asset accumulation
than the averages. That is, the mean levels somewhat mask the severe downward trend in
asset accumulation for low-income preretirement Americans. The distribution of assets has
always been skewed, so it is hardly surprising that its median is below its mean. But the
skewness increased dramatically since 2002 and the distance between the median and mean
has become astounding.
In the HRS measure of net assets not including pension wealth, the median was 39% of the
mean in 2002 (and in 1992). In 2014, the median was 16% of the mean.22 The skewness is not
as pronounced in the measure of net wealth including pensions, but the trend is similar. In the
measure including pensions, the median was nearly 61% of the mean in 2002 but only 44% in
2010.
The trends in asset accumulation seen in Table 7 were particularly pronounced in the bottom
three quintiles of net assets. Table 8 shows the bottom three quintile dividing points in net
worth from 1992 through 2014. In the measure of net wealth not including the value of
pension wealth, more than 20% of middle-age Americans has a net wealth less than or equal to
zero in 2010 and 2012!

22

A similar pattern is seen when using the HRS measure total wealth including secondary residence. The
mean/median ratio was 39% in 1992 and 2002, and was 15% in 2014.
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Table 8
Bottom Three Net Wealth Quintiles for Ages 47 -61 (in 2016 $)
Not Including
Pension Wealth
20th Percentile 40th Percentile 60th Percentile

Year
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014

$27,371
$31,742
$33,255
$32,865
$39,026
$40,023
$24,903
$20,834
$15,622
$0
$0
$203

$104,494
$112,635
$116,256
$113,378
$121,258
$133,545
$113,079
$118,199
$97,807
$36,591
$30,315
$33,456

$210,412
$235,966
$233,276
$237,062
$259,102
$295,106
$279,521
$310,438
$260,849
$132,300
$117,949
$122,165

Including
Pension Wealth
20th Percentile 40th Percentile 60th Percentile
$131,722
$139,338
$147,050
$149,084
$158,394
$166,840
$145,318
$148,999
$132,654
$81,102

$259,680
$279,182
$284,316
$309,062
$333,362
$345,902
$338,331
$346,536
$311,240
$221,124

$436,214
$466,114
$487,525
$523,050
$592,840
$610,501
$585,297
$625,863
$584,506
$430,017

The downward trend in the measure of net wealth including pension wealth may be less
shocking at first glance, but is actually considerably larger in magnitude. Net wealth not
including pensions at the 20th percentile was quite low before 2002, so there is not much space
for it to fall. But net wealth including pensions at the 20 th percentile fell by more than half
between 2002 and 2010.
To quantify the trend in each wealth quintile (to match with retirement income quintiles in the
CPS data), the asset data (for ages 47 through 61) are sorted into quintiles in each year. A
regression equation is then estimated for each quintile. To be specific, net wealth including
pensions is regressed against age, the real value of the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA), and
year.23 The broader measure including pension wealth is used despite losing two years of data
because it yields somewhat more conservative estimates of a downward trend in asset
accumulation. Net wealth is expected to increase with age and with real stock prices.
The results of these regressions are reported in Table 9. The coefficients of interest are those
on year. Net wealth of preretirement-age Americans declined over the 1992-2010 period for all
five quintiles, although the decline is not statistically significant for the top quintile. Net wealth
declines by roughly $4,000 annually for the bottom three quintiles. In percentage terms,
however, the decline is particularly large at the low end of the wealth distribution.

23

Real house prices (the Freddie Mac House Price Index adjusted by the CPI) were also initially included in the
regression but it was generally not statistically significant (and had an unexpected negative coefficient) when other
explanatory variables were included.
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Table 9
Estimated Effects on Net Wealth including Pensions (for Ages 47 - 61 in 2016 $)

Ist Quintile

2nd Quintile

3rd Quintile

4th Quintile

5th Quintile

Age

$952
3.49

$1,088
5.05

$2,088
6.38

$3,542
6.21

$919
0.09

DJIA

$5
13.68

$9
29.61

$18
36.69

$27
33.88

$92
5.44

Year

-$3,826
-16.52

-$4,209
-22.81

-$3,792
-13.43

-$2,687
-5.56

-$1,526
-0.18

7,431

7,520

7,536

7,554

7,563

$62,484

$216,518

$416,582

$716,456

$2,051,633

-6.12%

-1.94%

-0.91%

-0.38%

-0.07%

N

Mean Net Wealth
Growth Rate
t statistics in italtics

Scenario 3
It appears that retirement preparation is significantly lower for future retirees compared to
those retired in 2009-2013. Thus, the future fiscal costs are likely to be substantially greater
than calculated in Scenario 2.
It is assumed that the negative annual growth rates of net asset accumulation for each quintile
estimated in Table 9 describe both past and future trends. That is, the -6.12%, -1.94%, etc.
estimates are assumed to be the same over the entire relevant period of preretirement asset
accumulation. It is also assumed that the cumulative percentage changes will ultimately create
proportionate impacts on retirement incomes. That is, if the cumulative percentage change in
assets is X%, then retirement income also changes by X%. Although this proportionate
assumption might be somewhat problematic for upper-income households, it should be
reasonable for lower-income households, which is the relevant subpopulation for most of the
fiscal costs. The proportionate relationship between retirement assets and retirement income
is also assumed to hold across states (i.e., the relationship does not vary across states).
The relevant cumulative percentage changes are determined by the age difference between
those observed in the 2009-2013 CPS data on retirement income and public assistance and
those turning age 65 between 2018 and 2032. The age 65 -79 cohort observed in the 2009-
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2013 CPS data average about 14 years ahead of the cohort turning 65 in 2018.24 Thus, the
cumulative percentage changes are the estimated annual growth rates compounded over 14
years for the 2018 cohort, 15 years for the 2019 cohort, etc.
These cumulative percentage changes are applied to mean retirement income in each quintile.
For example, the mean retirement income for the bottom quintile in the CPS data was $4,701,
which is projected to shrink to $2,069 for the bottom quintile turning age 65 in 2018. The mean
retirement income for the second quintile is $13,730, and it is projected to shrink to $10,642
for the second quintile turning age 65 in 2018. Etc.
The estimated relationship between means-tested transfer payments and retirement income
for each quintile shown in Figure 1 and the estimated numbers of new 65-year-olds shown in
Table 4 are then combined with the estimated changes in retirement incomes for each quintile.
This yields an estimate of the additional public assistance created by falling saving for
retirement. Adding these additional costs to the Scenario 2 estimates yields a third scenario.
Table 10 reports the Scenario 3 estimates. These are the most-likely estimates of the fiscal
costs associated with future retirees. The national cost of public assistance on the retirementage population is projected to exceed $86 billion by 2032, which is nearly 2.4 times higher than
in 2016. The fiscal cost in Maine is almost $362 million in 2032, and Maine’s share is $61
million, which is more than 2.2 times greater than in 2016.

24

The middle of the age cohort is age 72 (i.e., 7 years ahead), and middle year of the data is 2011 (also 7 years
ahead).
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Table 10
Estimated Fiscal Costs from New Retirees (in 2016 $) - Scenario 3
United States
Total
Cost

Year
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
2030
2031
2032

$4,727,301,571
$9,697,150,906
$14,930,627,266
$20,399,802,301
$26,115,113,133
$31,972,518,709
$37,911,501,387
$43,985,533,648
$50,233,894,621
$56,476,415,397
$62,772,344,066
$69,058,496,552
$75,150,378,111
$80,897,298,810
$86,425,799,580

Maine
Cost to
States

$1,117,173,921
$2,291,667,655
$3,528,462,731
$4,820,959,017
$6,171,623,051
$7,555,867,458
$8,959,390,476
$10,394,828,926
$11,871,465,401
$13,346,721,699
$14,834,599,554
$16,320,167,064
$17,759,823,728
$19,117,957,927
$20,424,474,296

Total
Cost
$21,236,635
$44,067,508
$66,991,083
$90,440,387
$115,984,726
$141,296,504
$167,269,306
$193,521,295
$218,641,158
$244,575,228
$269,878,612
$294,107,532
$317,375,244
$338,932,927
$361,599,782

Cost to
Maine Govt.
$3,599,714
$7,469,659
$11,355,317
$15,330,089
$19,659,980
$23,950,450
$28,352,967
$32,802,808
$37,060,748
$41,456,700
$45,745,748
$49,852,668
$53,796,660
$57,450,793
$61,292,936

Counterfactual Scenarios
Two simple counterfactual scenarios are explored to illustrate the likely fiscal savings in the
future if more preretirement Americans were better financially prepared for retirement.
Table 11 shows illustrative fiscal implications from reversing the recent decline in asset
accumulation among preretirement Americans. The difference between Scenario 2 and
Scenario 3 is created by the significant decline in net worth in the lower half of the wealth
distribution. Table 11 reports the estimated difference in projected spending on public
assistance caused by this phenomenon. Or, how much taxpayers would save if the trend in
asset accumulation were reversed.
If the decline in asset accumulation were reversed, the projected national fiscal savings would
exceed $21 billion by 2032. The projected fiscal savings in Maine would be nearly $89 million in
2032. Moreover, these fiscal effects would not be the result of an ambitious program for
increasing retirement savings. These effects would be the result of just retirement savings not
declining.
A second illustrative counterfactual scenario is shown in Table 12. This table shows the fiscal
effects per $1,000 of retirement income for the lowest two quintiles. The fiscal effects are
heavily concentrated in the bottom 40% of the retirement income distribution. Nationally, 90%
(86% in Maine) of the fiscal costs in Scenario 3 come from the bottom two quintiles. Thus, this
scenario essentially highlights the marginal impact of retirement income on costs to taxpayers.
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Table 11
Estimated Annual Fiscal Savings if the Decline in Retirement Savings were Reversed (in 2016 $)
United States
Total
Cost

Year
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
2030
2031
2032

-$961,555,235
-$2,029,910,293
-$3,205,219,429
-$4,477,517,846
-$5,845,085,220
-$7,280,495,441
-$8,765,084,565
-$10,306,509,516
-$11,910,100,502
-$13,529,294,025
-$15,174,021,760
-$16,825,294,688
-$18,434,262,281
-$19,959,725,690
-$21,429,051,922

Maine
Cost to
States

-$227,238,397
-$479,716,136
-$757,469,669
-$1,058,144,080
-$1,381,332,813
-$1,720,554,426
-$2,071,398,185
-$2,435,673,604
-$2,814,640,336
-$3,197,294,319
-$3,585,982,645
-$3,976,217,756
-$4,356,455,109
-$4,716,958,435
-$5,064,195,209

Total
Cost

Cost to
Maine Govt.

-$4,272,962
-$9,126,258
-$14,229,738
-$19,644,106
-$25,693,097
-$31,848,618
-$38,285,574
-$44,897,634
-$51,333,778
-$58,027,484
-$64,621,269
-$70,988,616
-$77,137,940
-$82,870,360
-$88,862,460

-$724,288
-$1,546,946
-$2,412,010
-$3,329,772
-$4,355,106
-$5,398,497
-$6,489,592
-$7,610,369
-$8,701,327
-$9,835,943
-$10,953,622
-$12,032,918
-$13,075,259
-$14,046,932
-$15,062,623

Table 12
Estimated Annual Fiscal Savings if Retirement Incomes of the Bottom Two Quintiles were $1,000 Greater (in 2016 $)

Total
Cost

Year
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
2030
2031
2032

-$280,124,989
-$561,785,771
-$846,233,964
-$1,131,875,670
-$1,419,314,190
-$1,702,988,548
-$1,980,026,821
-$2,253,596,983
-$2,525,899,714
-$2,788,126,772
-$3,043,693,762
-$3,289,931,149
-$3,518,661,533
-$3,723,805,752
-$3,912,229,664

United States
Cost to
States
-$66,200,205
-$132,763,354
-$199,985,235
-$267,489,172
-$335,417,738
-$402,456,743
-$467,927,483
-$532,578,627
-$596,930,246
-$658,900,743
-$719,297,308
-$777,489,066
-$831,543,502
-$880,023,965
-$924,553,022
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Maine
Total
Cost
-$1,200,346
-$2,435,319
-$3,622,130
-$4,787,288
-$6,013,917
-$7,180,392
-$8,335,019
-$9,459,985
-$10,489,346
-$11,520,045
-$12,485,149
-$13,367,872
-$14,177,419
-$14,884,481
-$15,615,756

Cost to
Maine Govt.
-$203,465
-$412,798
-$613,969
-$811,469
-$1,019,388
-$1,217,112
-$1,412,826
-$1,603,514
-$1,777,996
-$1,952,704
-$2,116,294
-$2,265,920
-$2,403,142
-$2,522,992
-$2,646,947

Nationally, an additional $1,000 in retirement income would raise average retirement income
by 20% for the first quintile, and 7% for the second quintile. It would lead to more than $3.9
billion in fiscal savings by 2032. An additional $1,000 in retirement income in Maine would
raise average retirement income by 16% for the first quintile, and 7% for the second quintile. It
would create $15.6 million in fiscal savings in 2032.
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